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Abstract
Belgium is characterised by a comparatively high tax wedge. Starting from the end of the 90’s there has
been a growing concern over the eﬀect of high labour costs on the employment of low skilled workers. One
of the most innovative measures implemented by the federal government is the targeted reduction on social
security contributions for low skilled workers: the Workbonus. The subsidy has increased steadily over the
period 2000-2006. At the same time the eligibility to the beneﬁt was considerably extended. The innovative
feature of the tax credit is that - diﬀerently from other measure existing in OECD countries - eligibility is
based on full-time equivalent earnings. The instrument therefore distinguishes between low skill and low
eﬀort and avoids the disincentive eﬀect on labour supply at the intensive margin that is typically found in
traditional measures means-tested on disposable income or earnings. This paper assesses the eﬀects of the
Workbonus on labour supply using diﬀerent econometric frameworks. In particular, we compare estimates
based on a traditional labour supply model, with results based on a modeling framework which accounts for
heterogeneity in individuals’ job opportunities. Results show that accounting for demand side constraints
leads to signiﬁcantly lower estimates of labour supply eﬀects. Nevertheless, the measure has a positive
impact on labour supply and comparatively low cost per additional job created.
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In the framework of the Lisbon-strategy, Belgium is faced with the challenge of increasing its
employment rates. According to EUROSTAT, the overall employment rate amounts to 60.3%
(2006), compared to 63.5% for the entire European Union (EU-27). Particularly striking in the
case of Belgium is the gap between the employment rates of the less educated and the medium
and highly educated population. The employment rate of the low skilled (ISCED 0-2) population
aged between 25 and 64 years is only 39.4% in 2006, as opposed to an average of 46.9% for EU-27,
and of 50.6% for EU-15. In contrast, the employment rate of the high skilled population is 82.3%
in Belgium i.e. in line with the EU-15 average of 82.9%. For the medium skilled population the
gap with respect to the EU-15 is in the order of 6 percentage points.
While globalisation and skill biased technological change are often invoked to explain the weak
employment rates amongst the less skilled population (Moore and Ranjan, 2005), the wide range of
cross national variation in the employment rates of low skilled workers suggests that institutional
characteristics of local labour markets have a signiﬁcant impact on the performance of employment
amongst the less skilled. In particular the level of regulation of the labour market is often supposed
to have a more adverse eﬀect on this group. Similarly, high labour costs tend to have a stronger
impact on the employability of low skilled labour, since the labour demand for low skilled workers
is more elastic than the labour demand for high skilled labour.
From a labour supply perspective, the tax and beneﬁt system has an important impact on the
ﬁnancial incentives faced by households to enter the labour market. It is often argued that the high
level of taxation on labour income coupled with generous income support out of employment is
one of the main causes of persistent lower employment levels amongst the low skilled population.
While income support for the unemployed is not particularly high in Belgium, the tax burden
tends to be comparatively high. According to EUROSTAT, the tax burden on low earnings was
in the order of 49.2% in Belgium, i.e. the highest of all EU-27. In the same year the EU-27 and
EU-15 averages were of 39.7%.1
The European countries characterised by high taxes - high beneﬁts systems have implemented
several instruments (i.e. generalised reductions of personal income tax, tax credits on low earnings,
subsidies on social security contributions and/or in-work beneﬁts) aiming at improving the ﬁnancial
incentives to take up work amongst the low skilled population, while maintaining high levels of
social protection. The potential labour supply eﬀects of these so-called ‘Making Work Pay’ (MWP)
policies are reviewed in Orsini (2006b).
In order to analyse the potential behavioural eﬀects on reforms of the tax and beneﬁt system
one needs a structural labour supply model. Unfortunately, there is no general agreement in the
research community on which approach is the best to this end. An important generalisation of
the conventional textbook model to accommodate nonconvex budget sets was made by Hausman
and others, see for example Hausman and Ruud (1984) and the references therein. However, the
so-called Hausman approach has turned out to be impractical as regards complicated nonlinear
1 Low earnings correspond to 2/3 of average earnings.
1budgets constraints, see Bloemen and Kapteyn (2008) for a discussion on this topic.
van Soest (1995) proposed a discrete choice approach to labor supply modeling. The advan-
tage with this approach is that it is much more practical than the conventional continuous choice
approach in the presence of complicated budget constraints. Neither the Hausman model nor the
conventional discrete choice model can, however, easily deal with rationing of jobs and quantity
restrictions on hours of work. Typically, ﬁgures on distributions of hours of work show substan-
tial peaks at full-time and possibly part-time hours of work, which is reasonable to interpret as
stemming from restrictions on hours of work. As a result, the conventional and the discrete choice
models are unable to account for observed peaks at full-time and part-time hours of work found in
most countries. An ad hoc adjustment consists in introducing in the standard model alternative
speciﬁc disutilities, which supposedly capture the higher search costs related to job opportunities
with standard and non-standard hours requirements.
The alternative modeling approach examined in this paper is based on the model developed
by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and Dagsvik and Jia (2008). Similarly to the models of van Soest
(1995), this approach is also developed within a discrete choice framework. Theoretically, however,
it diﬀers in that labour supply behavior is viewed as an outcome of agents’ choices from a set of
feasible jobs, each of which is characterised by oﬀered hours of work and nonpecuniary (qualitative)
attributes. Moreover the set of available job opportunities varies amongst the agents - allowing for
a rationing eﬀect that is neglected in the standard modeling.
The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand it discusses alternative approaches for
modeling labour supply for the purpose of policy evaluations, and on the other hand it provides an
assessment of the impact of the Workbonus - an innovative ‘MWP’ instrument recently introduced
in Belgium, that could be of great interest for continental European countries with labour markets
and institutional setting similar to the Belgian one.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes the peculiarities of the Belgian
Workbonus by comparing it to other ‘MWP’ policies, section 3 presents the data and the microsim-
ulation model, section 4 describes in detail the labour supply models used and section 5 discusses
the estimates, section 6 analyses the impact of the Workbonus and section 7 concludes.
2 ‘Making Work Pay’ policies and the Belgian Workbonus
Instruments to increase the ﬁnancial incentives of the less skilled population to take up work
have been increasingly popular in continental Europe in the past decade. Germany, France, the
Netherlands and Belgium have all introduced measures to boost the income of low skilled workers
(Orsini, 2006b).
These supply side policies follow an orientation that has since long characterised the Anglo-
Saxon countries. An overall reduction of the tax burden was at the heart of policy reforms that
took place in the UK and later in the US starting from the end of the 70s when the Thatcher
and the Reagan administrations brought about extensive tax cuts. More important for the low
skilled workers were however the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Family Credit (FC),
2eventually replaced by the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC). Both policy instruments were
speciﬁcally designed to encourage employment amongst the low skilled population, by increasing
the revenue of poor households where one or both parents are engaged in paid work.
Despite the relative consensus on the need of such targeted instruments, concerns arise about
their optimal design. Policies which are means-tested on household rather than individual income,
such as the EITC or the WFTC, are better targeted at households in need, such as lone mothers,
but may also discourage second-earners’ labour supply and women’s in particular. Several studies
point at these contrastive eﬀects, using both ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ methodologies: see Eissa and
Liebman (1996), Bingley and Walker (1997), Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Duncan and Giles (1996)
and Blundell et al. (2000). Bargain and Orsini (2006) have simulated the WFTC for Germany
and France and ﬁnd that the measure would have an overall negative impact on labour supply due
to the strong disincentive on the labour supply of females in couples.
Individualised schemes such as the Dutch ‘Arbeidskorting’ or the former Belgian tax credit on
low earnings (Cr´ edit d’impˆ ot pour les bas revenus d’activit´ e profesionnelle - Belastingkrediet voor
lage inkomsten) have less ambiguous eﬀects on the labour supply of secondary earners, but they
face diﬃculties in targeting the most needy households. Moreover, measures which are phased-
out as earnings increase, still have a negative impact on labour supply at the intensive margin
(Orsini, 2006a).
After decades of demand side policies, policy makers in Belgium have recently implemented
supply policies aiming at reducing unemployment and inactivity through decreasing the tax burden
on labour income - especially for the low skilled. Indeed, Belgium is the EU country where the
taxation on the low earnings is the highest. As it is the case in most Bismarckian welfare states,
the high tax burden on low earnings is often driven by the ﬂat-rate contribution rates of the
compulsory insurance system.
A targeted reduction on the social security contributions (SSC) of low skilled workers has been
in place since 2000. The subsidy was progressively extended over the years. Following the 2004
expansion, the subsidy became known as the Workbonus (Bonus ` a l’emploi - Werkbonus). In
2006, the budgetary cost increased to over 650 million EUR/year (i.e. slightly over .2% of GDP).
Table 1 shows the level of the beneﬁt in 2000, 2001 and 2006, while ﬁgure 1 gives a graphical
representation of the progressive extension of the subsidy. As shown in the picture, not only has
the level of the subsidy increased signiﬁcantly over time, but eligibility has been progressively
extended to medium-low earnings. In the 2000 system, according to the National Oﬃce for Social
Security, less than 250,000 persons were eligible, as compared to over a million in 2006.
The design of the bonus is fairly simple: individuals with full-time equivalent (FTE) earnings
up to a threshold of 1053.55 EUR in 2000 (1125.19 EUR and 1258.88 EUR in 2001 and 2006
respectively) and above a minimum level are eligible to the full amount of the beneﬁt: 64.45 EUR
per month (81.8 EUR and 140 EUR per month in 2001 and 2006 respectively). As FTE earnings
exceed such threshold, the SSC reduction is tapered away at a rate of 0.40 (0.3806 and 0.1712 in
32001 and 2006 respectively) until it reaches zero.2
One of the peculiarities of the Workbonus is that eligibility and level of the beneﬁt are directly
related to the individual’s earning potential, rather than the actual earnings. That is, in order to
deﬁne eligibility, current earnings are transformed into full-time equivalent earnings. Consequently,
medium or high skilled workers only working part-time or a marginal amount of hours are not
entitled to the beneﬁt. Moreover the amount of the beneﬁt is computed pro-rata with respect to
working time, so that workers working part-time at minimum wage only get 50% of the beneﬁt.
This feature distinguishes the Belgian subsidy from similar measures implemented in the UK,
Germany, and the Netherlands.3 Screening out workers with low earnings due to low eﬀort (labour
supply), the subsidy avoids the well known inconvenient built-in in most income or earning tested
instruments, that individuals reduce labour supply at the intensive margin ﬁnding compensation
in the subsidy.
3 Data and microsimulation model
The analysis relies on a sample of administrative data constructed in a two step sampling procedure.
First a random sample of 100,000 individuals was sampled from the set of all individuals who,
according to the National Register, were alive on January 1st 2002 and known to have their main
place of residence in Belgium. Individuals in this random sample could be either living in private
or collective households (i.e. retirement homes, prisons, etc.). In a second step, the sample was
extended with all household members of those individuals sampled in the ﬁrst step and living in
private households. The ﬁnal sample comprises a set of 305,019 individuals. Sample weights have
been constructed to inﬂate the sample to the 2001 total population level and to correct for the
overrepresentation of larger households which is due to the sampling method. For this sample,
a data set with micro data from various administrative sources was constructed. Apart from
some household characteristics taken from the National Register (age, sex, relationship between
household members, region and population density in the residence area), the data set consists
of variables taken from the ‘Datawarehouse labour market and social protection’. At the time
of writing, the data set we dispose of contains a) labour market income and a number of labour
market characteristics for wage earners in either the private or public sector, b) some labour market
characteristics and incomes of the self employed c) information on various social beneﬁts such as
unemployment beneﬁts, sickness and disability beneﬁts and pensions. All variables in our data set
contain registrations for the tax beneﬁt year 2001.
For the purpose of modeling labour supply we selected a subsample of households. The sub-
2 Note that the minimum level of earnings is redundant since labour market legislation sets the minimum wage
above the minimum threshold. The only cases in which the minimum level becomes relevant is for apprenticeships
for which the minimum wage may be lower. Since 2004 the minimum threshold was therefore taken away altogether.
Note also that the levels of the maximum beneﬁts cited above are those for white collar workers. Blue collar workers
enjoy slightly higher amounts given that they face a slightly higher contribution rate.
3 The French Prime Pour l’Emploi (PPE) shares similar features, but the amount of the beneﬁt is also a function
of the family situation and the scaling with respect to working time is not linear, so that the beneﬁt still delivers a
part-time premium (Orsini, 2006b).
4sample is made of individuals in working age (18-65) available for the labour market, i.e. not
(pre)retired, nor sick or disabled. For this purpose we used the age and the labour market status
at the beginning of the fourth quarter. Youngsters under the age of 25 who are not employees, self
employed or registered as unemployed are assumed to be in full-time education and not available
for the labour market. Children over 25 with undeﬁned professional status, on the other hand,
are assumed to be inactive and thus potentially available for the labour market. This assumption
allows us to neglect simultaneity issues of educational investment and labour supply. In modeling
labour supply we also excluded the self employed, due to lack of information on the hours worked.
This standard practice is not particularly harming in the current analysis since the Workbonus
only aﬀects employees. Such modeling hypothesis may however bring in signiﬁcant biases in the
analysis of reforms that aﬀect the whole labour force - e.g. an income tax reform. Employees,
unemployed and inactives are treated as having a ﬂexible labour supply. For couples we of course
also have the possibility of mixed cases. For example a household may consist of a self employed
husband and of an employed wife, or vice versa. These groups are not modeled.
Besides the ‘standard’ cases of singles and couples there is a residual group of households which
contains diﬀerent types of families and forms of cohabitation: this includes homosexual couples or
cohabiting ﬂatmates, brothers and sisters or other relatives sharing a same housing arrangement,
and mainly couples with grown up children also available for the labour market. From the labour
supply perspective, this group tends to be rather heterogenous, and the degree of ‘unity’ of the
household (i.e. the extent to which the income of one member inﬂuences the decisions of the other
members) is unknown and/or diﬃcult to deduce. In other words, it is not possible to determine
whether labour supply should be modeled as an individual or joint decision. We therefore follow
the bulk of the literature on ex-ante evaluations and decide not to model these households.
Table 2 summarises the selection process for the whole population while ﬁgure 2 gives a visual
explanation of the selection procedure and of the modeling strategy. Following the selection we are
able to model 32,521 couples, 14,710 single males and 13,574 single females, i.e. almost 80% and
70% of males and females available for the labour market. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics
of the modeled samples.
The use of an administrative dataset for the purpose of labour supply estimation is unusual.
Relying on administrative data has some clear advantages, typically the quality of the income
information - at least as far as replacement incomes and earned income in the formal economy are
concerned. On the other hand, there are also some disadvantages. The most prominent one is the
lack of relevant information like the education level. Another important limitation is the deﬁnition
of the labour market status of individuals. The latter relies entirely on the source of incomes.
Individuals who do not receive pension beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts or sick and invalidity
beneﬁts and who are currently not earning any income from labour are automatically classiﬁed as
inactive. The latter moreover are supposed to be available for the labour market. It is however
likely that some of these individuals are working in the shadow economy, while some others are
not available to the labour market due to a ‘discouraged worker’ eﬀect. Arguably, information
5derived from income surveys might be aﬀected by greater measurement error in some dimension,
but the information on actual behaviour is likely to be more accurate. This and other diﬀerences
should be kept in mind when comparing both the characteristics of the underlying population and
the labour supply model estimates.
MIMOSIS is a microsimulation model for the Belgian social security and personal income tax
system, running on the administrative dataset described above. Since the data go back to the
tax beneﬁt year 2001, the legislation that is currently modeled as baseline legislation, is the one
of 2001. The current version of the model aims to cover 6 policy domains: a) social security
contributions, b) unemployment beneﬁts, c) sickness and disability beneﬁts, d) family beneﬁts, e)
social assistance beneﬁts and f) personal income taxes.
Through MIMOSIS it is possible to analyse the distributional impact of changes in the tax and
beneﬁt system, like, for example, the introduction and the extention of the Workbonus. Table 4
shows, for the whole population, the average household social security contributions that would
be paid in each decile of equivalent household disposable income, if the Workbonus did not exist.4
The next two columns show the level of the SSCs paid in 2001 and the amounts of SSCs that would
be paid in 2001, had the 2006 system been implemented in 2001. MIMOSIS is purely static and
thus simulates only the immediate or ‘day-after’ eﬀect, neglecting the agents’ potential behavioural
adjustments.
Workbonus 2001 is mainly in favour of the 3rd and 4th decile. The bottom deciles typically
include elderly households with pensions as the main source of income. The extension of 2006 also
beneﬁts the 5th and the 6th decile. Note that in particular the 2006 extension has a considerable
eﬀect on the average disposable income. The increase in disposable income of the 3rd and 4th
decile is in the order of .55%. Finally, for higher income households the eﬀect of the work bonus
approaches 0 in percentage terms. In absolute terms, however, the reduction in social security
contributions paid is still signiﬁcant, which provides evidence that low skilled workers may be
found in all segments of the income distribution.
The use of a microsimulation model in this kind of analysis is not only limited to the static
analysis. On the one hand, microsimulation allows to translate the complex real world tax beneﬁt
system into the budget constraints - a step that as we shall see is fundamental for the estimation
of labour supply models.5 On the other hand, the underlying database with micro information on
a representative sample of households or individuals allows to complement the standard aggregate
results (e.g. for the budget) with a rich and detailed distributional analysis.
A key variable in the labour supply model is gross wage. For the individuals active in the labour
market we determined the gross wage by dividing gross labour income during the 4th quarter by
the number of contractual hours, two variables which are both registered by the Datawarehouse.
For the unemployed and inactives, we ﬁrst tried to reconstruct their gross hourly wage by retrieving
the last recorded hourly wage for those who had been active on the labour market before as wage
4 Deciles are constructed on the population of individuals using household disposable income adjusted with the
squared root of household size to account for economies of scale.
5 The - often hidden - interactions between diﬀerent income components and eligibility rules need a level of detail
in the program only available in a genuine microsimulation model.
6earner. If both current and past labour market information was lacking, we assumed the individual
could at least obtain the minimum hourly wage (6.92 EUR in 2001).6 Overall the average gross
hourly wage (either registered or reconstructed) amounts to 13,00 EUR (in 2001 prices).
Assuming that the hourly gross wage stays constant across diﬀerent working time options, we
computed gross labour income for discrete intervals of weekly labour supply. The intervals ranged
from 0 to 55 hours, in steps of 5 hours.7
4 Modeling labour supply: two alternative characterisations
4.1 The conventional discrete choice modeling approach
The standard discrete choice approach enables the researcher to straightforwardly apply quite
general speciﬁcations of the utility function deﬁned on a pre-selected discrete set of points on
the individual’s or the household’s budget constraint. This approach is convenient because no
marginal calculation is needed. Speciﬁcally, it enables the researcher to straightforwardly apply
quite general speciﬁcations of the utility function and the budget constraint. However, it fails
replicate the peaks on full-time and part-time hours that typically characterise the distribution of
working hours (especially in continental Europe). Fixed costs of hiring workers, increasing returns
to scale of the worker’s production and the prevalence of standard employment contracts may
explain the relative scarcity of some working time alternatives, especially in the Belgian and in
other highly unionised labour markets. More importantly, however, the overall number of working
opportunities varies across individuals: highly educated professionals are typically confronted with
several job opportunities, whereas low skilled workers are constrained to choose among few jobs
or may have no job oﬀer at all.
As mentioned in the introduction, the conventional discrete choice approach is basically a
version of the standard approach, and therefore cannot accommodate restrictions on the set of
feasible jobs and explain peaks on full-time and part-time hours.This issue will be taken up in the
econometric model proposed later in section 4.2. Let us however ﬁrst introduce the conventional
discrete choice modeling approach.
Let U(C,Hf,Hm) denote the utility function of the household, where Hf and Hm are hours of
work for the female and the male in the household, respectively. The ﬁnite set of possible values
of working hours is denoted as Df and Dm. We assume that hourly wages are individual speciﬁc
and do not vary across those possible working hours. C is the household disposable income (or
consumption in a static framework), corresponding to the chosen level of labour supply.It is a
6 We are aware that the standard procedure to impute missing wages, is to estimate a wage equation (either a
linear regression or a Heckman two stage wage equation). However, since one of the crucial explanatory variables
of the wage equation, level of education, is missing we could not fall back on this technique. The imputation
is relatively marginal for single males and males in couples (less than 7% of the sample. For single females the
imputation concerns about 15% of the sample and for females in couple about 24% of the sample).
7 The introduction of possible labour supply above the legal maximum of 38 hours a week for a single full-time
job reﬂects the possibility of a combination of multiple parttime jobs. That people in practice do combine multiple
jobs on the Belgian labour market is illustrated in Vermandere and Stevens (2002).
7function of the hours of work combination, i.e.
C = C(Hf,Hm) = wmHm + wfHf + I − t(wmHm,wfHf,I)
where wr r = m,f is the wage rate for gender r, I is the household nonlabour income and t() is
the tax function.All the details of the tax/social security rules can be taken into account in this
function.
Following the Random Utility Model (RUM) approach, the utility function for the household
when the female and male works Hf and Hm hours respectively may be represented as:
U(C,Hf,Hm) = v(C(Hf,Hm),Hf,Hm) + ε(Hf,Hm)
where v(.) is a deterministic function which also depends on household observed characteristics.
{ε(Hf,Hm)} are random taste shifters. These random taste shifters are assumed to account for
unobservable individual characteristics that aﬀect preferences and will vary across households.
We assume that the random error terms {ε(Hf,Hm)} are i.i.d. across all hours of work com-
binations and households with c.d.f. exp(−exp(−x)) for real x. Then it follows from well known
results (see McFadden (1974)) that the probability that household chooses the combination of
hours (Hf,Hm) is given by:












where ψ(Hf,Hm) = exp(v(C(Hf,Hm),Hf,Hm).
As anticipated in the introduction, the above speciﬁcation fails to reproduce the observed dis-
tribution of working hours. Typically,participation is under predicted and part-time positions are
overpredicted. This pattern may be indeed explained by supply side factors alone, like ﬁxed costs
of labour supply. However, the fact that other working time alternatives are typically over pre-
dicted too, suggest that other factors may play a role. In particular technological and institutional
constraints may lead to lower availability of job opportunities with non standard working hours.
van Soest (1995) proposes an ad hoc adjustment, by introducing alternative speciﬁc dis-utility
elements. The latter take the form of alternative speciﬁc dummies:
U(C,Hf,Hm) = v(C(Hf,Hm),Hf,Hm) + cm(Hm) + cf(Hf) + ε(Hf,Hm).
van Soest (1995) suggest that the dummies may be interpreted as the higher search costs of
relatively scarce job opportunities, but in the context of non dynamic structural modeling their
economic interpretation is at least obscure and may capture both rationing and diﬀerent nonpecu-
niary characteristics of jobs with non standard working hours requirements. The probability that






4.2 The model with choice among latent job opportunities
In the current subsection an alternative modeling framework is introduced8. In contrast to the
approach described above where the household is restricted to have preferences solely over combi-
nations of total consumption and hours of work of the partners, we allow the agent in addition to
have preferences over nonpecuniary job attributes such as the nature of the job-speciﬁc tasks to be
performed, and location of the workplace, etc, which are assumed to be known by the household,
but unknown to the econometrician.
Let U(C,Hf,Hm,z) denote the utility function of the household, where C, HF and Hm are
deﬁned as above and z = (zF,zM) indexes the combination of jobs for the female and male in the
household. We assume that
U(C,Hf,Hm,z) = v(C(Hf,Hm),Hf,Hm) + ε(z).
where v(.) is a positive deterministic function and {ε(z)} are positive random taste shifters. The
random taste shifters are assumed to account for unobservable individual characteristics and non-
pecuniary job-type attributes that aﬀect utility, and hence will vary both across households and job
opportunities. Note that this is diﬀerent from the standard discrete hours labor supply discussed
in section 4.1, where the random taste shifters are assumed to vary across household and hours of
work. ε(z) are assumed to be i.i.d. across job combinations and household with exp(−exp(−x))
for real x. For a given job opportunity zr r = f,m, associated hours of work is assumed ﬁxed. Let
B(Hf,Hm) denote the set of feasible job opportunities with hours of work combination (Hf,Hm).
The probability of household of choosing a particular combination of jobs z then is given by:















The above equation clearly resembles equation 1. In the standard model, however, working
hour requirements univocally characterise each job alternative. The set of available alternatives is
therefore deﬁned by all possible combinations of female and male working time alternatives, which
in terms implies that the empirical counterpart of equation 1 is the observed fraction of couples
where the female and the male work Hf and Hm hours respectively.
8 For a more complete description we refer to Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) and Dagsvik and Jia (2008).
9In the current version, the working time requirements do not univocally characterise the choice
set. For each combination of working time requirements there will be a set of alternative opportu-
nities, each being characterised by unobservable nonpecuniary characteristics. Moreover the size
of the choice set is unknown. The empirical counterpart of the above equation is therefore not
observable.
What is observed, however, is the empirical counterpart of the probability that a household
chooses a combination of jobs with given working time requirements Hf and Hm. The latter is











Since the structural part of the utility is not aﬀected by the unobserved non pecuniary char-





where M(Hf,Hm) is the total number of job alternatives available to the female and to the male
in the household that require Hf and Hm hours of work.
We assume further that the choice sets of jobs oﬀered to the female and to the male, respectively,
are independent. The latter assumption may be restrictive because husband and wife may face
the similar constraints on the choice of jobs due to the structure of the local labor market. It is
however easy to allow the choice sets of husband and wife to be correlated, but a discussion of this
extension will be left for another occasion. Given this independence assumption, we have:
M(Hf,Hm) = Mf(Hf)Mm(Hm),
where Mr(Hr) denote the number of feasible job opportunities with hours of work Hr for gender r.
Unfortunately, we do not dispose on external information the number of available job opportunities,
nor do we know the number of non working opportunities. 9 However, what we are really interested
in the relative distribution of job opportunities across the diﬀerent levels of hours of work, and
relative size of the market opportunity set with respect to the non working opportunities. Both
are identiﬁed given our framework. To see this, we write that Mr(Hr) = ˜ θrgr(Hr) for Hr > 0,
where ˜ θr =
P
x>0 Mr(Hr) is the total number of feasible market opportunities available to gender
r, and gr(Hr) = Mr(Hr)/
P
x>0 Mr(Hr) the share of available jobs at given working hours Hr.
The terms gr(Hr) Hr > 0 are called opportunity densities.
Under these assumptions, for Hf > 0,Hm > 0, the probability equation (3) can now be written
9 Identiﬁcation cannot be achieved through parametric assumptions that impose structures on Mr(Hr) either,


























where θr = Mr(0)/˜ θr = Mr(0)/
P
x>0 Mr(Hr). Similar results can be obtained for the case when
Hf = 0 or Hm = 0.
From equation (4), we see that under the restriction that gr() is a distribution function over
the possible positive hours of work, both θr and gr(.) are identiﬁed. gr(.) describes the distribution
of job opportunities across the diﬀerent levels of hours of work. The term θr can be interpreted
as a measure of relative size of the market opportunity set with respect to the non working op-
portunities, which is assumed to be individual speciﬁc. In the empirical application part of this
analysis, we assume that θr is a function of individual characteristics such as age, region dummy
and wage rate. 10
Note that the conventional discrete model presented in the previous section, can be viewed
as a special case of the current model. In the standard discrete choice approach the opportunity
density is simply assumed uniformly distributed and θr = 1.
The ad hoc correction with alternative speciﬁc dis-utilities can be seen as a reformulation of
our framework with. gr(x) = exp(cr(x)) and θr = exp(cr(0)). In other words, our framework oﬀers
a theoretical rationale and alternative interpretation for this practice.
4.3 Functional forms for utility representation
As stated above, identiﬁcation is conditional on the a priori speciﬁcation of the utility function.
Current quantitative economic research often suﬀers from the lack of theoretical principles on which
assumptions about functional forms of the utility function can be made. The standard approach in
empirical analyses is therefore to simply assume a given functional form, or worse to ‘let the data
determine’ functional forms within ad hoc selected parametric classes (including so-called ﬂexible
functional forms). This is clearly unsatisfactory in the context of structural modeling. Structural
modeling should rely on a modeling framework explicitly derived from justiﬁed (or justiﬁable)
assumptions on the working of the economy and not on a trial-and-error procedure determining
which model best reproduces the observed data.11
10 Note that the we can extend our model to account for so called dis-utility of working. However, in this case,
we will not be able distinguish the dis-utility of working from the working opportunities measure θ given the labor
supply data typically available. Stated preference data such as self reported desired hours of work can be useful in
this respect. For example Bloemen (2008) uses subjective information on desired weekly working hours as a source
of information in addition to observed working hours to to separate preferences from job oﬀer distributions in a job
search model.
11 This point is also stressed by Aaberge et al. (2006): in a simulation exercise they show that diﬀerent econometric
speciﬁcations are compatible with the ‘true model’, i.e. the econometric speciﬁcation used to generate the data. The
ﬁt of the data, may therefore not be a criterion to select amongst alternative speciﬁcations. At the same time,
however, the diﬀerent speciﬁcations lead to substantially diﬀerent predictions of eﬀects under diﬀerent tax regimes.
11In the preceding sections we have proposed a particular representation of the labor supply
choice probabilities in terms of functions that represent preferences and opportunities. We now
turn the attention to the functional speciﬁcation of the structural utility term.
Dagsvik and Strøm (1989) for example applied a second degree polynomial speciﬁcation of the




where αc, αf and αm are negative and where Lf = 1 − Hf/T and Lm = 1 − Hm/T represent
the hours of leisure, normalised with respect to the total time endowment T, which is set at 80
hours per week.
This speciﬁcation has the advantage of being ﬂexible and easy to estimate because it is linear
in parameters and has therefore been extensively applied, see Blundell et al. (2000), Bargain and
Orsini (2006) and Bonin, Kempe, and Schneider (2002). Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002) applied
even a more general polynomial speciﬁcation (up to ﬁfth degree).
In empirical analysis the parameters on consumption and male and female leisure are speciﬁed
as linear functions of individual and household characteristics. However, the drawback with this
speciﬁcation is that it is not always globally concave and monotone.
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) argue that implications from the theory of psychophysical mea-
surement and dimensionality analysis may be used to derive more plausible functional forms. As
it appears in the literature of psychophysical measurement, numerical representations of sensory
perceptions and physical stimuli can only be measured up to a scale. The latter implies that - once
basic needs (subsistence) are fulﬁlled - the absolute levels of quantities tend not to be essential,
rather the individuals relate to relative consumption levels. The utility function should not contain
a satiation point and ordering of utilities should not be dependent on scale transformations. These
assumptions may be satisﬁed by the Box-Cox utility function:
V (C,Hf,Hm) = βc


















where C0 represents a subsistence level of income. If αc < 1,αf < 1,αm < 1 and βc > 0 and
βf and βm are positive and suﬃciently large, then utility is increasing in C and decreasing in Lf,
Lm for ﬁxed C.
The speciﬁcations for singles (males and females) are similar to the above equations, although
the structural utility only contains one leisure term.
5 Estimation results
The labour supply is estimated separately for couples, single males and single females. For each
group, four diﬀerent models are estimated. Model I is the standard discrete choice model as
12deﬁned in equation (1); model II is the standard model with ad hoc adjustment for the non
standard working time requirements as deﬁned in equation (2) and model III is the alternative
speciﬁcation deﬁned by equation (4). The latter models have been estimated using the quadratic
speciﬁcation of the utility function deﬁned by (5). Finally, model IV uses the model of equation
(4), in conjunction with the Box-Cox utility function deﬁned in (6).
Table 5 presents the results of the model I, and ﬁgures 3, 4, 5 and 6 present the ﬁt of the
observed distribution of working hours for males and females in couple and for single males and
females respectively. As anticipated, model I performs very badly in ﬁtting the data. In particular
the model predicts the inactivity peak and a more or less normal distribution of working hours along
the range 5 to 55, but does not capture the full-time peak for males and the part-time and full-
time peak for females. Moreover, inactivity is strongly underpredicted, whereas the non standard
working alternatives are overpredicted. Although the model fails to reproduce the distribution of
working hours, it predicts correctly the average labour supply over the whole sample.
Model II uses dummies in order to ﬁt the part-time and full-time peaks. Additional dummies
were introduced for marginal part-time (5 to 15 hours hours per week), the 3/4 full-time (25 to 35
hours per week) and over-time (45 to 55 hours per week). Through diﬀerent speciﬁcations, it was
found that 10 dummies (5 for females and 5 for males) were necessary to ﬁt the observed data.
This ad hoc way to ‘calibrate’ the model on the observed peaks in the distribution of working hours
is not uncommon in the empirical literature, see amongst others Haan (2006), Bonin, Kempe, and
Schneider (2002).
The last rows in table 5 and table 6 show the percentage of observations with a positive deriva-
tive of the utility function with respect to consumption and leisure. The theoretical consistency
of the model, requires that the derivatives with respect to income are positive. In the estimation,
in fact, we only consider the points on the budget constraint frontier, under the assumption that
these points are always preferred to the internal points. If households prefer less income to more
income the theoretical consistency of the model would vanish.
The negative derivatives with respect to leisure, on the other hand, are less harming and may be
caused by diﬀerent factors. Working is a key element of integration in our societies and inactivity
is often stigmatised. Some individuals could therefore ﬁnd higher utility in renouncing to some
hours of leisures. Indeed this implies that some individuals may have an internal saturation point
with respect to leisure.
In model I almost all cases have positive derivatives with respect to consumption and leisure
(at the chosen hours supplied). The negative coeﬃcient on income square is supposed to capture
the decreasing marginal utility of income. The coeﬃcients on the squared leisure terms of single
males and females, however, are not negative which imply that the utility function is not concave
in leisure.
In model II the coeﬃcients have the expected sign, but a large share of cases have a negative
ﬁrst derivative with respect to leisure and a very few cases also with respect to consumption. The
cases with negative derivative with respect to consumption typically correspond to households with
13outlying income levels. However, a few outliers turn out to have an internal saturation point. As
long as the number of cases is marginal this should not represent a major concern. The model
could be reestimated leaving out the outliers and would substantially deliver the same results.
Arguably, non well behaved estimated preferences with respect to leisure may be caused by a
misspeciﬁcation of the opportunity sets - rather than a consistent representation of true house-
holds’ preferences. In particular, inactivity may well be the result of rationing, while not all job
opportunities may be equally available to all individuals. Let us therefore turn to models III and
IV.
Model III relies on the speciﬁcation deﬁned by equation (4) - which is supposed to correct for
latent and heterogeneous choice opportunities - in conjunction with a quadratic speciﬁcation of the
utility function. The fraction of feasible jobs is assumed to depend on individual characteristics
such as productivity (for which the wage rate is a proxy), age, age squared and region of resi-
dence. Feasible jobs are then assumed to be homogenously oﬀered for non standard working time
requirements with a part-time and full-time peak for females and a full-time and a 35 hours peak
for males. Table 7 shows the estimates of the preference structure of such speciﬁcation. The share
of households presenting an internal saturation point with respect to income increases marginally
for all groups. For single females, however, the share of households with a negative ﬁrst derivative
of the utility function with respect to income is far from being marginal. At least for this group
model III should therefore be discarded. However also the share of households having an internal
saturation point with respect to leisure increases.
This is not entirely surprising: the quadratic model is extremely ﬂexible without additional
constraints on the coeﬃcients. Adding a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the opportunity set increases the
degrees of freedom and thus the ﬁt of the model, as it is witnessed by ﬁgures 3, 4, 5 and 6 and the
strong decrease in the log-likelihood. As previously argued, nevertheless, the ﬁt of the model is not
an appropriate indicator in the context of structural modeling. An acceptable ﬁt of the data may
only be considered as a prerequisite for a labour supply model, but does not imply that the model
will perform well in predicting labour supply behaviour when the budget constraint is modiﬁed.
The Box-Cox utility function is less ﬂexible than the quadratic speciﬁcation and, for given
values of the parameters it is globally increasing and concave in both income and leisure. The
basic intuition is that a constrained representation of the preference structure entails a clearer
separation of the factors aﬀecting preferences and the factors aﬀecting opportunities.
In model IV we combine the model speciﬁed in equation (4) with this more restrictive Box-Cox
utility function. The ‘subsistence’ level of leisure is ﬁxed at 25 hours per week. The ‘subsistence’
level of income C0 is set at 4000 EUR/year for a single person household. We multiply the subsis-
tence level by
√
N, where N is the number of persons in the household, to account for economies
of scale in consumption in households with more than one person. We also tried a model with
an endogenous level of ‘subsistence’ income, but this failed to converge. The ‘subsistence’ income
approximately corresponds to the yearly minimum income guarantee in 2001. Just like in the
quadratic speciﬁcation, some coeﬃcients, namely βf and βm are modeled as a linear combination
14of observed individual and household characteristics. The estimates of this model are presented
in table 8. The value of the estimated parameters on consumption and leisure imply that the
utility function is globally concave for all modeled groups both with respect to income and leisure.
Moreover, model IV also ﬁts the data well.
As already stated the ﬁt of the data should not be a criterion for discriminating amongst
competing models, although arguably a good ﬁt of the data should be considered as a prerequisite
of a good model. The superiority of model IV, therefore, derives from the fact that diﬀerently from
the other speciﬁcations, it is build from clearly stated and justiﬁed assumptions on the working
of the economy and on the behaviour of agents, rather than on ad hoc representation of the
opportunity set and of the preference structure.
In table 9 we compare the elasticities derived under the 4 diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Elasticities
are derived numerically, by increasing the hourly wage by 1% and computing the expected change
in aggregate labour supply. In the following we will focus on the results of model II and model IV.
Model I is entirely discarded since it predicts a distribution of hours which is inconsistent with the
data, whereas model III is theoretically inconsistent for a large group of single females. Model II
on the other hand is also retained in order to stress the diﬀerent predictions of the standard model
and of the alternative speciﬁcation proposed.
Model II predicts labour supply elasticities at around .4 for single females and males (either
in couple or singles), whereas for females in couple, the labour supply elasticity is estimated at
.76. This result is consistent with several studies surveyed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999): single
males and males in couples tend to have lower labour supply elasticities than secondary earners,
i.e. females in couples. Overall, the estimated elasticities are higher than recent estimates for
other countries: Bonin, Kempe, and Schneider (2002) and Haan and Steiner (2005) have estimates
of around .20 and up to .35 for German males and females in couples. Although for females in
couples Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm (2004) and van Soest (1995) also ﬁnd particularly high
values, ranging from .60 to .70 (respectively for the Netherlands and Italy). Their estimated labour
supply elasticities for primary earners, however, are in the range of .1.
As shown in Bargain et al. (2006) not accounting for labour demand constraints induces an
upward bias in the estimates of labour supply elasticities. Model IV predicts lower labour supply
elasticities: .28 and .46 for males and females in couples respectively and .12 and .21 for single
females and single males. Model III also predicts lower labour supply elasticities for couples (.31
and .22 for females and males respectively) and for single males (.17).
The fact that single females have the lowest labour supply elasticities is at odds with the
experience of other countries - in particular the UK. It should be noted, nevertheless, that in
Belgium means tested aid for single parents, i.e. mostly single mothers, is rather limited. Contrary
to other countries, in fact, single mothers do not receive signiﬁcantly higher income support. At the
same time their unemployment beneﬁts tend to be lower due to weaker labour market attachment.
It is therefore likely that a relatively higher share of unemployed single females are aﬀected by
rationing on the labour market. On the other hand, the average household size of single females
15is 1.45 which implies a higher subsistence level of income. This factor is likely to limit for single
mothers the number of choices actually available, given that only alternatives with positive income
are considered as feasible.
Finally it should be noted that the elasticities estimated in accordance to model IV are also
higher than estimates for Belgium based on a standard model of labour supply (Orsini, 2006a). This
is only partially surprising: former estimates are in fact based on survey data. In the administrative
dataset at hand a higher share of non working individuals are classiﬁed as available for work. It is
likely that a share of the latter would declare themselves as not available for work in survey data
due to the ‘discouraged worker’ eﬀect. As shown in Bargain et al. (2006), elasticities are mostly
driven by the participation eﬀect, which implies that population sub-groups with higher inactivity
rates tend to have higher elasticities.
6 Results from policy simulations
Table 10 shows the estimated impact of the changes in the Workbonus: the ﬁrst two rows relate to
an abolishment of the work bonus and the second two rows relate to an extension from the 2001
to its 2006 level. The eﬀects are divided into an aggregate change in labour supply (i.e. change in
hours, although expressed in full-time equivalent - FTE) and a change in the number of participants
and are presented separately for the traditional model (model II) and for the alternative modeling
framework (model IV). As could be expected by the diverging labour supply elasticities, the two
models give quite diﬀerent predictions. Let us consider ﬁrst the abolishment of the Workbonus
2001. Should the subsidy be removed, according to the standard model labour supply would drop
by 15000 FTE units, whereas participation would decrease by 17000 units. Females in couples are
the main group driving the change in labour supply, since they account for an increase in FTE of
6000 units and an increase in participation of 7000.
The changes predicted by the alternative models go in the same direction, but the size of the
eﬀect is much smaller: labour supply would decrease by only 7000 FTE unit, whereas participation
would decrease by about 8000 unit in total. With respect to the composition of the change, the
models predict a similar pattern. The change in FTE units is driven by females in couples, then
males in couples and to a lesser extent to singles. The predicted change in participation and hours
supplied for single females is much smaller than the prediction according to model II, which is in
line with the large diﬀerences in the estimates of labour supply elasticities for this subgroup.
When we look at the eﬀect of the extension of the Workbonus to its 2006 level, the divergence
between the prediction of the two models persist. Model II predicts a change in labour supply of
about 23000 FTE, whereas according to model IV the increase should be in the order of 12000
FTE. With respect to participation the two models predict an increase of 25000 and 13000 units
respectively.
Note that the estimates of of model IV are not too far from Orsini (2006a): in that paper the
estimated labour supply eﬀect for couples ranges from 5200 to 8800 FTE units, whereas here the
change is in the order of 8000 units for couples. The model used in Orsini (2006a), nevertheless is
16a variation of a model II. As argued before, however, the extent of rationing could probably play
a diﬀerent role in administrative and survey data, since in survey data rationed individuals may
declare themselves as out of the labour force due to a ‘discouraged worker’ eﬀect.
Note ﬁnally that the increase in participation and in FTE units goes hand in hand in both
scenarios. As argued in the introduction, this is a peculiar eﬀect of targeting the beneﬁt on low
FTE earnings, rather than low current earnings. The last expansion of the Workbonus replaced
a tax credit on low earned income. Orsini (2006a) shows that compared to the Workbonus, the
tax credit would have had a higher participation eﬀect, but a smaller impact on aggregated labour
supply. Indeed the tax credit increase the incentives to take up work for the low skilled, but also
for the medium skilled willing to work part-time. At the same time, medium skilled workers in
employment would reduce labour supply, ﬁnding partial compensation from the tax credit. Since
the Workbonus is conditional on hourly wage, this negative eﬀect at the intensive margin is avoided.
Figure 7 shows the percentage change in participation and in aggregate labour supply by income
decile according to the two models. In particular the left axis indexes the change in aggregate
labour supply, whereas the right axis indexes the change in participation. The percentage change
is expressed with respect to total participation and total labour supply in each income decile. The
picture clearly show that the Workbonus increases participation in the lower income deciles, in
the ﬁrst 4 income deciles. The aggregate eﬀect, however, is positive for all deciles. The ﬁrst order
(static) distributional impact is reinforced by the second order (behavioural) eﬀect. Redistributive
and incentive eﬀects are therefore mainly directed to the bottom part of the income distribution.
Table 11 presents the costs of the 2006 increase in the Workbonus. The ﬁrst row shows the cost
of the Workbonus as derived from oﬃcial statistics. Based on the data of the Belgian National
Social Security Oﬃce we have computed the reduction of revenue from social security contributions
due to the 2006 expansion as the diﬀerence between the 2006 ﬁgure and the 2001 ﬁgure (inﬂated to
2006 values). In the second row we show the reduction in social security contributions simulated by
MIMOSIS. This ﬁgure is derived simply by applying the 2006 rules on the 2001 baseline. The 443
million EUR predicted by MIMOSIS are close to the oﬃcial ﬁgure of 481 million EUR, considering
that the microsimulation model does not account for changes in demographic factors and other
economic circumstances - including additional labour market participation induced by the beneﬁt
itself.
Once we account for behavioural adjustments, the cost increases substantially according to
model II (524 million EUR), while model IV predicts an aggregate cost of 483 million EUR which
is very close to the observed cost of the measure.12
Table 12 presents the cost per additional FTE unit and per additional participant of the 2001
and 2006 extensions, as well as the forecasted cost of the speculative further extension described
above. The cost with respect to participation (total budgetary cost divided by the number of
additional participants) is estimated to be in the range of 11430 EUR/year (model II) to 18404
12 The change in revenue from social security contributions is not the true cost of the reform. Following the
reduction in social security new participants would not only stop collecting their unemployment or income assistance
beneﬁts, but they also pay social security contributions and personal income taxes. These eﬀects are not considered
here.
17EUR/year (model IV) for the 2001 Workbonus and in the range of 21015 EUR/year (model II) to
40330 EUR/year (model IV) for the 2006 Workbonus. Clearly further expansions of the measure
would imply higher budgetary cost per additional job created.
The above ﬁgures may be compared with estimates obtained for similar activation measures
implemented in other EU countries. Orsini (2006b) reviews a series of evaluation of ‘Making Work
Pay’: according to estimates based on the reviewed works the cost of activation ranges from about
250000 EUR/year for the WFTC to about 120000 EUR/year for the French PPE.13 Moreover it
should be noted that some activation measures, as the German Mini-job reform despite having a
positive eﬀect on participation, tend to have an overall negative eﬀect on labour supply in terms
of FTE. This is explained by the fact that the subsidies are targeted on some household income
concept rather than on individual earnings or the wage rate.
The low budgetary cost of the Workbonus should nevertheless not lead to overoptimistic con-
clusions. The relevant element for comparison should be the ‘beneﬁt’ of an additional worker.
A proxy for that could be given by the average productivity of a worker. According to recent
statistics the average labour productivity of the Belgian worker is in the order of 67000 EUR/year.
For low skilled workers, however, the productivity is likely to be lower. Nevertheless it is dubious
that productivity is the relevant beneﬁt indicator in a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
A political discussion on further extension of the Workbonus calls for an improved under-
standing of the beneﬁts of increased employment, including the eﬀects on the income distribution
and the possible positive externalities stemming from the mainstreaming of marginalised groups.
Economists, in particular, should devote more attention to the beneﬁt side in the evaluation of
policies aiming at making work pay. At the same time, an assessment of a particular reform and
not just an estimate of its potential impact on the labour force, would be easier in a balanced
budget context. Unfortunately the public debate is often silent over the way a speciﬁc measure is
ﬁnanced and subsidies and tax cuts tend to be presented as ‘manna from heaven’.
Note that the above considerations are based exclusively on the results of the ex-ante evalua-
tion. It would be interesting to validate the results with an ex-post evaluation. Unfortunately no
data is yet available for estimating the eﬀect on employment based on a diﬀerence in diﬀerence
approach. The data will probably be available in the near future. Nevertheless, it seems diﬃcult to
think of a valid comparison group for the evaluation of the Workbonus. In a diﬀerence in diﬀerence
methodology, the comparison group should share the same characteristics of the treated group -
apart of course from the eligibility to the subsidy. This implies that the two groups may be consid-
ered to be equally aﬀected by changes in the economic circumstances - a hypothesis which seems
quite unlikely given that the two groups are in two diﬀerent segments of the wage distribution.
13 Of course the above ﬁgures are also aﬀected by the underlying modeling framework and sample selection.
Moreover the costs also reﬂect diﬀerences in the preference structure and in the institutional settings. Nevertheless
the ﬁgures give an order of magnitude of the ‘eﬃciency’ of similar MWP measures implemented in EU countries.
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This paper relies on a sample of administrative data and on the microsimulation model MIMOSIS
to evaluate ex-ante the eﬀect of the Belgian Workbonus, a subsidy on social security contributions
of employees aimed at supporting the employment of low skilled workers. In the ﬁrst part of the
paper we have discussed and tested diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the labour supply model. The ﬁrst
speciﬁcation fails to capture the demand side and institutional constraints that drive the presence
of part-time and full-time peaks in the distribution of hours supplied. The ad hoc speciﬁcation
proposed by van Soest (1995) (model II) produced a good ﬁt of the observed data. Model III
combines the quadratic speciﬁcation of the utility function with an improved representation of
the opportunity set. This model also produced a good ﬁt but clearly shows the limitation of the
quadratic speciﬁcation of the utility. The share of households with negative derivative of utility
with respect to consumption increases substantially and can no longer be neglected - at least for
the group of single females. The quadratic model combined with heterogeneity in job opportunities
gives rise to an over-parameterised model which ﬁts the data extremely well, but fails to preserve
economic consistency.
Model IV uses a Box-Cox utility function consistent with psychophysical evidence on the be-
haviour of agents. Moreover, the results show that the data support the modeling framework.
Model II and model IV were both used for assessing the Workbonus. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to discriminate between model II and model IV, since tests based on the ﬁt of the data
should not be considered as valid selection criteria in the context of structural modeling. We argue
however that the superiority of model IV comes from its reliance on plausible hypothesis on the
working of the economy as well as on a set of (accepted) assumptions of agents’ behaviour. Finally
results are presented using both model II and model IV, as this allows us to stress the sensitivity
of the results on the modeling framework.
The 2006 increase in the Workbonus is likely to have increased participation by 13000 to 25000
units (according to model IV and model II respectively). Having computed the budgetary cost of
the reform (before and after behavioural responses) it is possible to derive an eﬃciency measure of
the Workbonus. In particular the cost per additional participant were estimated to be in the order
of 21015 and 40330 EUR/year for model II and model IV respectively. Although the ﬁgures are
quite diﬀerent they are far below the estimated cost of instruments like the British WFTC (over
200000 EUR/year) or the PPE (around 120000 EUR/year).
The Belgian Workbonus remains so far a unique case of individualised subsidy based on the
wage rate - rather than on earnings. This allows to target low skilled workers and screen out
individuals with a higher preference for leisure. At the same time workers with higher wage rates
cannot reduce their working time in order to enter in the beneﬁt range.
It should nevertheless be stressed that the Workbonus is particularly suited for the Belgian
economic and institutional framework: the presence of the minimum wage coupled with highly
centralised wage bargaining procedures should reduce the risk that employers rip the beneﬁt of
the reform by oﬀering lower gross earnings to Workbonus-workers. Another possibility is that
19ﬁrms misreport the number of hours worked. By declaring more contractual hours than those
actually worked, an employer could eﬀectively oﬀer a lower wage. While the possibility of such
behaviour should not be excluded ex-ante, we argue that its aggregate eﬀect should be negligible.
Nevertheless some ex-post analysis in the following years should allow to verify to what extents
employers have beneﬁted from the Werkbonus possibly also through illegal behaviour.
Should the ex-post analysis conﬁrm that agents have conﬁrmed to legislation, it would be
interesting to explore to what extent other elements of the tax and beneﬁt system could be refocused
on the wage rate - rather than on earned income. The Belgian experience should therefore deserve
greater attentions by policy makers in European countries that share institutional and labour
market characteristics comparable to the Belgian ones.
20Tab. 1: The Belgian tax reform and the employment bonus
Year Gross monthly earnings (FTEE) White collar workers Blue collar workers
2000
<842.84 0 0
≥ 842.84 and <1053.55 64.45 69.61




≥ 859.69 and < 1125.19 81.8 88.35
≥ 1125.19 and <1340.11 81.8 - (0.3806*(FTEE-1125.19)) 88.35 - (0.4111*(FTEE-1125.19))
≥ 1340.11 0 0
2006
<1258.88 140 151.2
≥ 1258.88 and <2076.63 140 - (0.1712*(FTEE-258.88)) 151.2 - (0.1849*(FTEE-1258.88))
≥ 2076.33 0 0
FTEE is full time equivalent gross monthly earnings.
Amounts are expressed in EUR/month.
Tab. 3: Descriptive statistics (modeled subsamples)
Singles Couples
Males Females Males Females
Demographics
Household size 1.05 1.45 3.14
Children under 3 0.00 0.05 0.19
Children from 3 to 6 0.01 0.07 0.19
Children from 6 to 12 0.02 0.15 0.37
Children from 12 to 23 0.03 0.15 0.38
Age of male (head) 35.05 - 40.82
Age of female (head/spouse) - 37.18 38.68
Living in Wallonia 0.33 0.34 0.31
Living in Flanders 0.53 0.50 0.62
Living in medium cities 0.53 0.52 0.60
Living in big cities 0.35 0.36 0.25
Labour Supply
Hours worked (all) 25.26 20.35 30.29 18.77
Hours worked (population in employment) 33.99 32.34 35.67 29.67
Hourly Wages
Hourly wage (all) 11.77 10.69 14.34 10.93
Hourly wage (population in employment) 12.73 12.14 15.12 12.46
Tab. 4: Change in social security contributions paid and in disposable
income by equivalent income decile
Social security contributions paid (EUR/year) Change in disposable income (in pct.)
Decile Without WB WB 2001 WB 2006 WB 2001 WB 2006
1 333 325 299 0.050 0.238
2 492 477 418 0.092 0.424
3 901 879 781 0.102 0.538
4 1297 1264 1140 0.122 0.567
5 1374 1366 1240 0.034 0.449
6 2131 2118 1980 0.044 0.457
7 2693 2678 2562 0.045 0.352
8 3650 3636 3520 0.033 0.287
9 4689 4679 4591 0.022 0.184
10 7093 7087 7049 0.009 0.061
Income deciles are constructed by equivalent household disposable income, using an equiva-
lence scale of the squared root of household size.
21Tab. 2: Sample selection for labor supply model
Males Females
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Number of cases in % Number of cases in % Number of cases in % Number of cases in %
Population 151806 100 4897974 100 153213 100 5137005 100
Adults 106902 70 3845866 79 110215 72 4131619 80
In working age (18-65) 83597 55 2814695 57 84011 55 2768708 54
With ﬂexible labour supply 59568 39 2032235 41 70003 46 2312637 45
- Couples
1 32521 55 998253 49 32521 46 998253 43
- Single males 14710 25 681730 34 - -
- Single females - - 13574 19 613322 27
- Males in couple
2 3737 6 122049 6 - -
- Females in couple
3 - - 11084 16 338450 15
- Other 8549 14 228879 11 12815 18 362429 16
1 Both partners with a ﬂexible labor supply.
2 Male with a ﬂexible labor supply living with a female partner with a ﬁxed labor supply.
3 Female with a ﬂexible labor supply living with a male partner with a ﬁxed labor supply.
2
2Tab. 5: Estimates: Model I
Couples Single Males Single Females
Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error
Consumption
Age of male 2.501 0.839 *** -3.095 2.723
Age of male squared -1.171 0.404 *** 1.420 1.398
Age of female 8.997 0.811 *** -18.002 2.652 ***
Age of female squared -3.277 0.404 *** 9.212 1.345 ***
No. of children under 3 0.182 0.065 *** -0.758 0.826 -1.916 0.313 ***
No. of children from 3 to 6 0.392 0.061 *** -2.104 0.569 *** -1.425 0.238 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 0.650 0.042 *** 0.237 0.341 -0.901 0.141 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.502 0.045 *** -0.931 0.301 *** -0.585 0.132 ***
Live in medium city -0.014 0.085 0.200 0.296 0.609 0.243 **
Live in big city -0.083 0.096 0.340 0.314 0.476 0.256 *
Live in Wallonia 0.191 0.108 * -0.518 0.300 * -0.755 0.236 ***
Live in Flandres 0.053 0.101 -0.260 0.279 -0.984 0.219 ***
Constant 5.067 0.584 *** 2.575 1.425 * 11.987 1.344 ***
Consumption squared -0.848 0.023 *** -0.290 0.106 *** -0.774 0.096 ***
Leisure of male
Age of male -4.527 2.613 * -29.662 5.456 ***
Age of male squared 6.116 1.266 *** 14.660 2.796 ***
No. of children under 3 0.232 0.162 -4.140 1.356 ***
No. of children from 3 to 6 1.214 0.156 *** -5.115 1.025 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 1.973 0.112 *** -3.507 0.639 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 1.394 0.121 *** -6.046 0.596 ***
Live in medium city 0.136 0.215 0.779 0.607
Live in big city 0.309 0.241 1.601 0.634 **
Live in Wallonia -0.636 0.262 ** -1.251 0.565 **
Live in Flandres -1.623 0.250 *** -2.083 0.528 ***
Constant 28.778 1.597 *** -0.446 2.956
Leisure of male squared -14.691 0.295 *** 12.062 0.706 ***
Leisure of female -67.840 4.975 ***
Age of female -2.488 2.363 34.527 2.523 ***
Age of female squared 7.930 1.203 *** -1.258 0.534 **
No. of children under 3 2.744 0.157 *** -2.764 0.385 ***
No. of children from 3 to 6 2.123 0.145 *** -2.114 0.251 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 2.579 0.104 *** -2.606 0.247 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 1.967 0.111 *** 1.187 0.451 ***
Live in medium city 0.019 0.199 1.367 0.470 ***
Live in big city 0.021 0.225 -0.823 0.419 **
Live in Wallonia 0.531 0.257 ** -2.790 0.392 ***
Live in Flandres -0.025 0.244 22.846 2.599 ***
Constant 11.768 1.363 ***
Leisure of female squared -1.861 0.232 *** 9.111 0.527 ***
Cross term consumption and male leisure -2.112 0.137 *** 12.293 0.552 ***
Cross term consumption and female leisure -2.634 0.117 *** 6.571 0.433 ***
Cross term male and female leisure 3.332 0.388 ***
Log likelihood -139434.860 -29618.456 -27008.271
dU/dC>0 99.689 99.993 99.186
dU/dLm>0 97.303 99.979
dU/dLf>0 99.945 100.000
23Tab. 6: Estimates: Model II
Couples Single Males Single Females
Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error
Consumption
Age of male 2.150 0.834 ** -2.167 2.447
Age of male squared -1.333 0.400 *** 1.237 1.252
Age of female 10.259 0.800 *** -7.029 2.501 ***
Age of female squared -4.202 0.399 *** 3.912 1.259 ***
No. of children under 3 -0.137 0.059 ** -0.010 0.821 -0.698 0.288 **
No. of children from 3 to 6 0.082 0.057 -0.873 0.487 * -0.769 0.223 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 0.318 0.040 *** 0.725 0.321 ** -0.557 0.130 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.226 0.043 *** 0.014 0.280 -0.357 0.122 ***
Live in medium city -0.003 0.084 0.266 0.265 0.551 0.229 **
Live in big city -0.077 0.094 0.482 0.284 * 0.455 0.242 *
Live in Wallonia 0.276 0.101 *** -0.455 0.268 * -0.437 0.222 **
Live in Flandres 0.204 0.095 ** -0.480 0.252 * -0.768 0.207 ***
Constant 3.930 0.570 *** 3.841 1.319 *** 5.913 1.268 ***
Consumption squared -0.650 0.022 *** -0.778 0.101 *** -0.604 0.086 ***
Leisure of male
Age of male -5.912 2.357 ** -34.095 4.886 ***
Age of male squared 5.360 1.135 *** 17.007 2.488 ***
No. of children under 3 0.288 0.141 ** -1.909 1.274
No. of children from 3 to 6 0.942 0.138 *** -2.220 0.880 **
No. of children from 6 to 12 1.655 0.099 *** -1.238 0.579 **
No. of children from 12 to 18 1.329 0.108 *** -2.860 0.538 ***
Live in medium city 0.213 0.193 0.887 0.536 *
Live in big city 0.384 0.215 * 1.828 0.561 ***
Live in Wallonia -0.230 0.228 -0.953 0.493 *
Live in Flandres -1.214 0.218 *** -2.332 0.465 ***
Constant 33.523 1.905 *** 6.304 3.370 *
Leisure of male squared -15.976 0.952 *** 4.938 1.640 ***
Leisure of female -46.674 4.526 ***
Age of female 2.391 2.191 24.297 2.272 ***
Age of female squared 3.850 1.109 *** 0.241 0.475
No. of children under 3 2.160 0.141 *** -1.122 0.350 ***
No. of children from 3 to 6 1.534 0.132 *** -0.782 0.223 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 1.911 0.095 *** -1.153 0.223 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 1.504 0.101 *** 1.000 0.405 **
Live in medium city 0.086 0.188 1.244 0.422 ***
Live in big city 0.076 0.210 -0.263 0.372
Live in Wallonia 0.675 0.228 *** -2.303 0.351 ***
Live in Flandres 0.240 0.218 30.534 3.185 ***
Constant 39.186 1.887 ***
Leisure of female squared -21.745 1.013 *** -6.890 1.623 ***
Cross term consumption and male leisure -3.558 0.140 *** 5.185 0.528 ***
Cross term consumption and female leisure -2.710 0.117 *** 3.000 0.391 ***
Cross term male and female leisure -5.391 0.386 ***
Males
Working 5 to 15 hours/week 3.849 0.095 *** 3.554 0.147 ***
Working 20 hours/week 4.015 0.136 *** 3.536 0.203 ***
Working 25 to 35 hours/week 4.189 0.160 *** 3.786 0.234 ***
Working 40 hours/week 2.717 0.168 *** 2.493 0.237 ***
Working 45 to 55 hours/week 7.054 0.166 *** 7.156 0.230 ***
Females
Working 5 to 15 hours/week 3.841 0.077 *** 3.732 0.130 ***
Working 20 hours/week 2.609 0.113 *** 2.969 0.188 ***
Working 25 to 35 hours/week 3.139 0.127 *** 3.705 0.217 ***
Working 40 hours/week 1.210 0.131 *** 1.615 0.227 ***
Working 45 to 55 hours/week 5.277 0.158 *** 5.899 0.251 ***
Log likelihood -95276.0090 -20181.2590 -18096.3240
dU/dC>0 99.6089 99.783 98.790
dU/dLm>0 69.9461 95.218
dU/dLf>0 59.1994 71.904
24Tab. 7: Estimates: Model III
Couples Single Males Single Females
Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error
Consumption
Age of male 3.837 0.884 *** -0.287 0.667
Age of male squared -2.474 0.425 *** -0.015 0.086
Age of female 8.758 0.801 *** -1.064 0.694
Age of female squared -4.007 0.398 *** 0.097 0.087
No. of children under 3 -0.357 0.062 *** 0.018 0.821 -1.002 0.290 ***
No. of children from 3 to 6 -0.027 0.060 -1.197 0.502 ** -0.866 0.229 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 0.180 0.042 *** 0.601 0.327 * -0.714 0.132 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.065 0.044 -0.117 0.281 -0.475 0.124 ***
Live in medium city 0.002 0.087 0.270 0.266 0.596 0.234 **
Live in big city -0.032 0.098 0.460 0.285 0.362 0.246
Live in Wallonia 0.465 0.111 *** -0.422 0.294 0.270 0.256
Live in Flandres 0.591 0.105 *** -0.179 0.281 0.112 0.242
Constant -0.145 0.612 0.841 1.400 2.059 1.388
Consumption squared -0.434 0.026 *** -0.363 0.103 *** -0.309 0.087 ***
Leisure of male
Age of male 2.954 3.565 -7.195 1.649 ***
Age of male squared -3.434 1.748 ** 0.674 0.219 ***
No. of children under 3 -0.514 0.150 *** -1.646 1.258
No. of children from 3 to 6 0.363 0.147 ** -2.598 0.891 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 0.944 0.105 *** -1.288 0.584 **
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.532 0.113 *** -2.758 0.534 ***
Live in medium city 0.195 0.203 0.897 0.531 *
Live in big city 0.405 0.226 * 1.776 0.556 ***
Live in Wallonia 1.386 0.402 *** -1.109 0.716
Live in Flandres 1.757 0.386 *** -1.564 0.691 **
Constant 39.935 2.163 *** 33.447 3.526 ***
Leisure of male squared -26.220 0.573 *** -14.631 1.070 ***
Leisure of female
Age of female 15.434 3.104 *** -6.916 1.537 ***
Age of female squared -5.721 1.586 *** 0.783 0.199 ***
No. of children under 3 1.739 0.148 *** -0.363 0.483
No. of children from 3 to 6 1.151 0.137 *** -1.244 0.358 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 1.405 0.098 *** -1.081 0.228 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.882 0.103 *** -1.399 0.228 ***
Live in medium city 0.077 0.192 1.089 0.414 ***
Live in big city 0.085 0.215 1.077 0.431 **
Live in Wallonia 2.660 0.369 *** 1.798 0.624 ***
Live in Flandres 3.427 0.354 *** 0.381 0.598
Constant 43.363 1.873 *** 38.890 3.203 ***
Leisure of female squared -36.989 0.623 *** -20.644 0.978 ***
Cross term consumption and male leisure -2.117 0.157 *** 6.263 0.539 ***
Cross term consumption and female leisure -1.115 0.130 *** 3.964 0.407 ***
Cross term male and female leisure 0.429 0.421
Theta males
Wage -0.213 0.007 *** -0.210 0.014 ***
Age -0.197 1.367 0.171 0.427
Age squared 1.662 0.669 ** 0.056 0.059
Live in Wallonia -0.554 0.146 *** 0.075 0.191
Live in Flandres -1.148 0.141 *** -0.1492 0.187
Constant 5.894 0.690 *** 5.544 0.744 ***
Part time peak 0.763 0.025 *** 0.824 0.037 ***
Full time peak 2.792 0.020 *** 2.780 0.034 ***
Theta females
Wage -0.328 0.006 *** -0.388 0.012 ***
Age -4.476 1.022 *** -0.845 0.365 **
Age squared 2.878 0.520 *** 0.143 0.048 ***
Live in Wallonia -0.832 0.123 *** -0.677 0.176 ***
Live in Flandres -1.238 0.118 *** -0.778 0.172 ***
Constant 10.833 0.502 *** 9.956 0.679 ***
Part time peak 0.600 0.0218 *** 0.500 0.039 ***
Full time peak 2.497 0.027 *** 2.838 0.036 ***
Log likelihood -93518.7620 -20081.9400 -17433.8970
dU/dC>0 97.8199 99.3279 93.5180
dU/dLm>0 79.4704 79.7311
dU/dLf>0 47.3965 58.8710
25Tab. 8: Estimates: Model IV
Couples Single Males Single Females
Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error Parameter St. Error
Consumption 2.709 0.039 *** 1.847 0.086 *** 0.994 0.064 ***
Exponent on Consumption 0.668 0.013 *** 0.278 0.022 *** 0.082 0.032 ***
Leisure of male
Age of male -5.242 0.692 *** -1.343 0.164 ***
Age of male squared 2.216 0.335 *** 0.154 0.021 ***
No. of children under 3 0.067 0.028 ** -0.195 0.142
No. of children from 3 to 6 0.109 0.026 *** 0.197 0.128
No. of children from 6 to 12 0.117 0.018 *** -0.171 0.059 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.042 0.018 ** -0.092 0.057
Live in medium city 0.059 0.034 * 0.050 0.043
Live in big city 0.169 0.039 *** 0.152 0.048 ***
Live in Wallonia 0.171 0.068 ** 0.056 0.070
Live in Flandres 0.162 0.065 ** -0.101 0.067
Constant 4.301 0.377 *** 3.730 0.389 ***
Exponent on leisure of male -1.474 0.065 *** -2.116 0.133 ***
Leisure of female
Age of female -0.985 0.213 *** -0.588 0.103 ***
Age of female squared 0.758 0.114 *** 0.073 0.014 ***
No. of children under 3 0.280 0.016 *** 0.380 0.059 ***
No. of children from 3 to 6 0.144 0.011 *** 0.095 0.036 ***
No. of children from 6 to 12 0.137 0.009 *** 0.163 0.024 ***
No. of children from 12 to 18 0.109 0.008 *** 0.099 0.020 ***
Live in medium city -0.006 0.012 -0.001 0.030
Live in big city -0.005 0.014 0.034 0.032
Live in Wallonia 0.066 0.019 *** 0.194 0.041 ***
Live in Flandres 0.136 0.019 *** 0.042 0.036
Constant 0.707 0.101 *** 1.487 0.219 ***
Exponent on leisure of female -3.722 0.072 *** -2.938 0.146 ***
Cross term male and female leisure 0.177 0.014 ***
Theta males
Wage -0.199 0.007 *** -0.204 0.012 ***
Age -0.002 0.950 -2.037 0.287 ***
Age squared 1.382 0.458 *** 0.275 0.038 ***
Live in Wallonia -0.522 0.092 *** -0.139 0.126
Live in Flandres -1.064 0.090 *** -0.525 0.123 ***
Constant 8.828 0.488 *** 9.257 0.542 ***
Part time peak 0.964 0.025 *** 0.852 0.038 ***
Full time peak 2.854 0.021 *** 2.664 0.035 ***
Theta females
Wage -0.305 0.006 *** -0.375 0.012 ***
Age -3.387 0.625 *** -3.020 0.256 ***
Age squared 2.439 0.318 *** 0.394 0.033 ***
Live in Wallonia -0.318 0.067 *** -0.345 0.102 ***
Live in Flandres -0.695 0.065 *** -0.709 0.099 ***
Constant 7.264 0.304 *** 12.458 0.501 ***
Part time peak 0.894 0.021 *** 0.635 0.039 ***
Full time peak 2.203 0.024 *** 2.655 0.033 ***
Log likelihood -95057.5150 -19995.1430 -17468.2260
dU/dC>0 100.00 100.00 100.00
dU/dLm>0 100.00 100.00
dU/dLf>0 100.00 100.00
Tab. 9: Labour supply elasticities
Singles Couples
Females Males Females Males
Model I Hours 0.439 0.418 0.916 0.453
Participation 0.262 0.281 0.32 0.124
Model II Hours 0.414 0.398 0.763 0.439
Participation 0.404 0.400 0.592 0.342
Model III Hours 0.077 0.167 0.311 0.218
Participation 0.114 0.214 0.236 0.168
Model IV Hours 0.117 0.213 0.462 0.286
Participation 0.121 0.203 0.312 0.204
26Tab. 10: Expected eﬀects of the Workbonus on labour supply (ﬁgures in 1000s)
Hours Participation Hours Participation
Singles Couples Singles Couples Total Total
Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males
No Workbonus
Model II -3 -2 -6 -4 -3 -2 -7 -4 -15 -17
Model IV -1 -1 -3 -2 -1 -1 -4 -2 -7 -8
Workbonus 2006
Model II 4 4 9 6 4 4 11 6 23 25
Model IV 1 2 5 3 2 2 6 3 12 13
Extended Workbonus
Model II 8 10 22 19 9 12 24 18 59 62
Model IV 2 5 11 11 3 6 11 10 29 30
Tab. 11: Reduction on SSC revenue and bud-




Model II - after behavioural adjustment 524
Model IV - after behavioural adjustment 483
1 Total spending on the measure in 2006 minus total spending
in 2001 (expressed in 2006 values). Source: ONSS/RSZ.
Tab. 12: Cost per participant and FTE unit (EUR/Year)
2001 Workbonus 2006 Workbonus
Cost per additional participant (model II) 11430 21015
Cost per additional participant (model IV) 18404 40330
Cost per additional FTE position (model II) 12811 21284
Cost per additional FTE position (model IV) 20807 41743
27Fig. 1: Subsidy on low skilled’s social security contributions
Amounts are in EUR/month.
28Fig. 2: Sample selection and modeling strategy
*both partners available for the labour market
**only youngsters living as singles or in couple.
29Fig. 3: Observed and predicted frequencies (Males in couples)
Fig. 4: Observed and predicted frequencies (Females in couples)
30Fig. 5: Observed and predicted frequencies (Single males)
Fig. 6: Observed and predicted frequencies (Single females)
31Fig. 7: Predicted change in labour supply by equivalent income deciles
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